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Aesthetics was historically an account of beauty and taste, with a significant focus on the 
senses, as the origins of the name in the Greek word for sense perception, “aiesthesis,” 
would suggest. For philosophers like Kant, critical judgment in aesthetics was complex and 
involved certain interactions between sense-perception and higher-order mental faculties 
like imagination and cognition. Such sharp distinctions have undergone major revision in 
recent years, which have seen publication of significant new books about the senses, 
including Mohan Matthen’s Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense 
Perception (Oxford, 2007), Casey O’Callaghan’s Sounds: A Philosophical Theory (Oxford, 
2010), Susanna Siegel’s The Contents of Visual Experience (Oxford, 2011), and Fiona 
Macpherson’s anthology The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Readings, 
(Oxford, 2011). Informed by new scientific research, these philosophical studies are re-
examining numerous issues, including the number and individuation of human senses; the 
nature of perceptual experience; the representational character of perceptual objects; the 
mechanisms that underlie sensation in the brain and body; and the links between perception, 
cognition, and sensory imagining. Advances of such a significant nature must inevitably 
affect how we conceptualize art and our interactions with artworks—as both creators and 
consumers.  
 
Empirical studies are likely to affect the philosophy of art in other ways as well. Aesthetics 
has traditionally relied upon a somewhat restricted and hierarchical notion of the objects of 
sensation worthy of respect. If not quite guilty of “visuocentrism” — focusing only on 
vision — aesthetics has nevertheless consistently focused on “higher arts” such as painting, 
sculpture, and music, while denigrating the cultural products that address our “lower” 
senses, ones more typically associated with appetites, such as taste, touch, and smell. 
Aesthetics has also virtually ignored sensory modalities that are now being given much 
greater attention, such as kinesthesia and proprioception. Scientists have also found very 
interesting results in studies of cross-modal sensory effects, indicating the ability of one  
_____________________________ 
Corresponding Author: Cynthia Freeland 
University of Houston 
email – cfreeland@uh.edu 
Essays Philos (2012) 13:2                                                                                                            Freeland | 400 
 
 
 
 
sensory system or brain region to process the inputs, or in some cases substitute for 
damaged areas of, another system. This phenomenon is related to synesthesia, the 
experience some people have that always links certain kinds of sensory phenomena in direct 
relationship to others — experiencing sounds or letters, for example, as being colored 
(summarized helpfully in Richard E. Cytowic and  David Eagleman’s Wednesday is Indigo 
Blue: Discovering the Brain of Synesthsia (2009)). 
 
The call for papers for this issue solicited submissions that would reflect the intersection of 
recent epistemological and neuroscientific studies with more traditional areas of aesthetics 
such as the nature of interpretation, definitions of beauty, audience responses to art, and art 
made in non-traditional media. This resulting issue of Essays in Philosophy, happily, 
features a wide variety of cross-disciplinary work. The art forms mentioned in the 
discussions vary from installation art to dance, and from musical experimentation and 
modern literature to film. The subjects covered range from some of the“big questions” such 
as how to interpret meaning in art (Jennifer McMahon) and the nature of beauty (Owen 
Ewald and Ursula Krentz) to more specific studies of the interaction among our senses or 
cross-modal perception (Kathleen Coessens, William P. Seeley, and Mark Paterson). The 
issue closes with two articles focusing on the artistic medium of film, exploring first (Luis 
Rocha Antunes) our vestibular responses to film, and second (my own article) how 
stereoscopic vision is employed and affected in viewing 3D films.. Also included along the 
way are some brief critical reflections: Cameron Buckner and Justin L. Harmon’s responses 
to McMahon on interpretation, and Christy Mag Uidhir on Seeley’s view of expression in 
art. I next offer a more detailed preview of the volume’s articles. 
 
In “The Aesthetics of Perception: Form as a Sign of Intention,” Jennifer A. McMahon 
discusses the nature of aesthetic judgment. Drawing upon recent studies of the nature of 
perceptual experience, McMahon infers that our aesthetic experience cannot be regarded as 
somehow “purely” sensuous and without cognitive mediation. Examples of work in new art-
forms, even when they seem strange and puzzling, will be “read” by perceivers as, at the 
very least, intentional — as made by a conscious agent for some purpose. She illustrates this 
point with examples of work by the artist Daniel von Sturmer, whose installations draw our 
attention to examples of diverse types of causation — he even calls them “experiments.” As 
we seek meaning in these and other artworks, we often do so by constructing a narrative. 
McMahon calls this the “principle of intention-in-order.” But McMahon recognizes that her 
outlook poses a challenge in explaining how art can be new or critical. How can art 
challenge existing conventions if audiences must rely upon some of those same conventions 
in constructing interpretive narratives? McMahon argues that creativity with a critical edge 
is possible, even though there is no “raw” perceptual data, by borrowing some theoretical 
tools from the work of Habermas and Adorno. 
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The issue includes two critical responses to McMahon’s paper. First, Cameron Buckner 
focuses on her discussion of the cognitive interpretation of “raw” sensory input in his paper 
“Ordering Our Attributions-of-Order.” Buckner draws an insightful comparison between 
McMahon’s example of how we begin constructing narratives to understand von Strumer’s 
installation works and similar narratives that are typically constructed in response to a 
famous psychological experiement, the Heider-Simmel animation. After watching this brief 
animation, viewers almost inevitably retell it as a drama involving triangles and circles 
caught up in a love affair, abduction, and escape. Why is this? Buckner says we are still not 
sure why we have such tendencies. He points to work by psychologist Eric Charles who has 
recently called for the development of a “psychophysics” of social cognition. 
 
In the second response to McMahon, “The Sensuous as Source of Demand,” Justin L. 
Harmon focuses less on the human tendency to pursue rich cognitive construals of 
somewhat minimal data, opting for a more ‘bottom-up” perspective. In resolving the tension 
between real creativity in art and the perceiver’s use of pre-existing conceptual schemes, 
McMahon draws on Adorno and Habermas, who held that “aesthetic form” can be 
communicated though non-discursive source of intelligibility. Harmon considers it more 
helpful to use Jacques Rancière’s discussion in Aesthetics and Its Discontents (2009), which 
argues that the critical aim of art is a “re-distribution of the sensible.” Something mundane 
and only minimally perceived, like the green color of an avocado’s flesh or the sound of a 
train whistle, can become sensuously significant and help reveal new ways of engaging with 
the world around us.  
 
The next article in this issue, by Owen Ewald and Ursula Krentz, takes up another major 
topic in aesthetics, the nature of beauty. In “Beauty and Beholders: Are Past Intuitions 
Correct?” the authors review how well four important definitions of beauty in Western 
philosophy hold up in light of recent experimental work in psychology and biology. They 
survey views supported in combination or part by Plato, Augustine, Hume, and Kant, 
including accounts that focus on beauty as a relationship among parts, a salient feature in a 
mass of details, utility, and/or cognitive pleasure. Ewald and Krentz argue that recent 
psychological experiments tend to confirm aspects of three of these views while leaving the 
utility account in doubt. Despite some empirical support for the other views, there are 
problems in confirming them either in studies of infants (the fourth) or of non-western 
cultures (the second). 
 
The next group of articles move from broad questions about meaning or beauty in art to take 
up the aesthetic implications of recent research into cross-modal perception. Kathleen 
Coessens in her article, “Sensory Fluidity: Dialogues of Imagination in Art,” addresses the 
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relation between imagination, perception, memory, and expression. She asks how artists can 
explore and communicate imagination through a variety of media such as literature and 
music. Using well-developed examples (a novel by Italo Calvino and avant-garde musical 
works by Helmut Lachenmann and Gyorgy Kurtag), Coessens develops a notion she calls 
“sensory fluidity.” This is a basic ability, exploited by artists and evoking appropriate 
responses from audiences, to integrate experiences from different perceptual origins. It 
employs embodied patterns of memory to move across time periods, and draws upon 
intersubjective patterns to promote sharing of affective experience. 
 
Some of the same issues treated by Coessens recur in William P. Seeley’s article, “Hearing 
How Smooth It Looks: Selective Attention and Crossmodal Perception in the Arts.” Seeley 
begins with some examples of the ways in which contextual information or trained motor 
skills can affect people’s perception of various visual symbols. We can also perceive 
emotion in watching a person’s gait, or assess qualities like tension in listening to music or 
watching a ballet. Hence, “there is a very real sense in which an expressive bodily gesture 
can look like music sounds.” To account for this, Seeley presents a model for multisensory 
integration in our engagement with artworks. A key role is played in such processing by the 
superior colliculus in the brain. It is part of an attentional network that integrates sensory 
information, primes perceptual systems, and inhibits distracters. Seeley suggests how his 
model can explain a range of crossmodal effects in our engagement with pictures, dance, 
and musical performances. 
 
In his remarks about this article, “Getting Emotional Over Contours: A Response to Seeley,” 
Christy Mag Uidhir raises specific questions about the implications of Seeley’s model in 
accounting for the role of emotions in art, particularly music. Seeley suggests that there is 
something he calls an “emotional contour” characteristic of an emotion that is potentially 
realizable across a range of media. Mag Uidhir briefly speculates about the implications of 
this idea for further enquiry into expression and emotion across the arts — as well as into 
the nature of the emotions themselves. 
 
Mark Paterson is also interested in cross-modal perception. His article, “Movement for 
Movement’s Sake? On the Relationship between Kinaesthesia and Aesthetics” surveys a 
vast sweep of historical and contemporary views on the so-called “inner” senses, including 
in particular kinaesthesia. Paterson’s detailed history begins with the treatment of aisthêsis 
in Aristotle and moves from there to later contributions, including ‘coanesthesia’ in the 
eighteenth century, the ‘muscle sense’ (Muskelsinn) in the nineteenth century, and ‘proprio-
ception’ (sic) and ‘kinesthesia’ in the early twentieth century. Paterson also draws upon 
Herder’s treatment of our response to three-dimensional sculpture with a kind of ‘inner 
sense.’ His goal is to explain how audiences experience certain felt qualities of movement 
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during dance performances, with implications for how other art forms such as architecture 
also can activate non-visual responses, including a haptic sense of engagement with space. 
 
Luis Rocha Antunes article “The Vestibular in Film – Orientation and Balance in Gus Van 
Sant’s Cinema of Walking” is related to Paterson’s study in that it too focuses on one of the 
inner senses, the vestibular — our sense of orientation and balance. Like kinaesthesia, this 
has not traditionally been included among the classic five senses. Film studies is generally 
restricted to the role of sound and sight, but Antunes notes there is an emerging cinema of 
the senses which pays broader attention to other sensory systems. His essay investigates our 
sense of orientation and balance in film by examining key examples he dubs the “cinema of 
walking” from the oeuvre of filmmaker Gus Van Sant. His films, including Elephant and 
Gerry, explore relationships among camera movement, narrative, character identity, and 
audience emotions in complex ways. Rocha describes the neural and physiological evidence 
relevant to explaining how images and sounds can provide us with access to the 
multisensory realm. 
 
In my own article, “On Being Stereoblind in an Era of 3D Films,” I consider the aesthetic 
potentials of 3D films in light of my own inability to perceive stereoscopically due to an eye 
coordination problem known as strabismus, a failure of fusion of the input from the two 
eyes by binocular neurons in the brain. Until recently it was held that such fusion must be 
acquired in childhood or it can never be recovered, but now certain practices of vision 
therapy allow some strabismics to achieve stereoscopic vision. Interestingly, some 3D 
effects in the latest sort of 3D films created using alternating polarized projections and 
lenses can be perceived by people like myself. My paper discusses principles of binocular 
vision and 3D film history. By examining critical discussions of some prominent examaples 
including Pina, Avatar, and Cave of Forgotten Dreams, I offer an overview of the aesthetic 
merits of contemporary 3D films, including several possible accounts of what is meant by 
the medium’s alleged superior “realism.” I conclude with some speculation about whether 
3D is indeed the medium of all future cinema. 
